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6.4.2 State-Federal Cooperation 
Separate	and	apart	from	the	question	of	whether	the	Federal	Circuit	should	relax	
its	immunity	doctrine	is	the	question	of	whether	patent	assertions	should	be	regulated	
by	state	governments	or	the	federal	government.	Drawing	on	a	pragmatic,	functional	
conception	of	cooperative	federalism	(see	generally	Hills	1998),	it	seems	that	both	state	
governments	and	federal	governments	should	play	a	role	in	this	area.	
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Congress	could,	if	it	chose	to	do	so,	expressly	preempt	state	laws	governing	
patent	assertions	pursuant	to	the	Supremacy	Clause.	A	single,	federal	statute	on	patent	
enforcement	would	have	the	benefit	of	providing	a	uniform	legal	standard	to	govern	all	
patent	enforcement	activities	undertaken	anywhere	in	the	country.	A	uniform	standard	
would,	in	theory,	allow	patent	holders	to	better	predict	whether	their	actions	are	lawful	
or	not.	
But	the	benefits	of	legal	uniformity	should	not	be	overstated.	Several	scholars	
have	questioned	whether	uniformity	is	a	sufficiently	important	policy	goal	in	the	patent	
system	that	it	should	outweigh	the	benefits	of	interjurisdictional	dialogue	and	
experimentation	(see,	e.g.,	Gugliuzza	2014,	48–51;	Nard	and	Duffy	2007,	1623;	Ouellette	
2015,	74).	Indeed,	state-by-state	regulation	in	the	realm	of	patent	enforcement	may	
have	significant	deterrence	value.	Rather	than	defending	against	one	investigation	
brought	by	the	Federal	Trade	Commission,	a	patent	holder	might	be	forced	to	defend	
against	multiple	lawsuits	in	multiple	states,	brought	by	both	private	plaintiffs	and	state	
attorneys	general.	
State	law	enforcement	agencies	also	provide	substantial	enforcement	resources.	
Dozens	of	states’	attorneys	general	offices,	joining	together,	could	monitor	and	punish	
deceptive	patent	enforcement	behavior	better	than	the	federal	government.	State	
governments	are	also	more	accessible	than	the	federal	government	to	the	small	
businesses,	nonprofits,	and	local	governments	most	likely	to	be	targeted	by	bottom	
feeders.	Vermont’s	pathmarking	statute,	for	instance,	was	the	product	of	a	grassroots	
effort.	Businesses	and	non-profits	in	the	state	that	had	received	spurious	demand	letters	
approached	their	state	legislators	and	attorney	general	and,	together,	they	drafted	
Vermont’s	statute	(Gugliuzza	2015,	1590–1591).	
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An	approach	to	regulating	patent	assertions	that	emphasizes	the	comparative	
advantages	of	state	governments	and	the	federal	government	would	be	optimal.	One	
clear	strength	of	federal	regulation	–	which	has	not	been	widely	discussed	by	
policymakers	or	in	the	academic	literature	–	is	that	it	could	provide	certainty	about	
which	courts	can	hear	cases	involving	unfair	or	deceptive	patent	assertions.	The	federal	
district	courts	have	exclusive	subject	matter	jurisdiction	over	cases	“arising	under”	
patent	law,	meaning	that	state	courts	cannot	hear	those	cases.	But	difficult	questions	
occur	when	a	plaintiff	asserts	a	state-law	claim	that	implicates	federal	patent	law	
(Gugliuzza	2014,	30–35),	such	as	the	Vermont	attorney	general’s	consumer	protection	
lawsuit	against	MPHJ.	MPHJ	was	able	to	delay	that	suit	for	nearly	a	year	by	arguing	that	
the	state	had	improperly	filed	the	case	in	state	court	(MPHJ	2014).	Congress	could	enact	
a	federal	statute	governing	patent	assertions	that	–	without	question	–	placed	claims	
under	the	statute	within	the	federal	courts’	exclusive	subject	matter	jurisdiction.				
A	federal	statute	governing	patent	assertions	could	also	reduce	uncertainty	on	
matters	of	personal	jurisdiction.	The	courts	of	a	particular	state	may	exercise	
jurisdiction	over	a	defendant	only	if	the	defendant	has	“certain	minimum	contacts”	with	
that	state	“such	that	the	maintenance	of	the	suit	does	not	offend	traditional	notions	of	
fair	play	and	substantial	justice”	(International	Shoe	1945,	316).	Under	the	Federal	
Rules	of	Civil	Procedure,	the	personal	jurisdiction	of	a	federal	court	is	typically	the	same	
as	the	jurisdiction	of	the	courts	of	the	state	in	which	the	federal	court	sits	(Federal	Rule	
of	Civil	Procedure	4(k)(1)(A)).	The	Federal	Circuit	has	held	that	a	patent	holder	who	
merely	sends	cease-and-desist	letters	into	a	state	does	not	subject	itself	to	personal	
jurisdiction	in	that	state	(Red	Wing	Shoe	1998,	1361;	see	generally	La	Belle	2010).	This	
rule	enables	litigants	such	as	MPHJ	to	argue	that	the	act	of	sending	demand	letters	into	
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Vermont	is	not	sufficient	to	allow	a	court	sitting	in	Vermont	–	state	or	federal	–	to	
exercise	personal	jurisdiction	over	it.	Under	that	reading	of	the	Federal	Circuit’s	case	
law,	any	litigant	who	wishes	to	challenge	MPHJ’s	demand	letter	practices	must	travel	to	
the	company’s	state	of	incorporation	(Delaware)	or	principal	place	of	business	(likely	
Texas).		
Congress,	however,	has	the	power	to	authorize	the	federal	courts	to	exercise	
personal	jurisdiction	on	a	nationwide	basis	(see	Federal	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	
4(k)(1)(C)).	Thus,	a	federal	statute	on	unfair	or	deceptive	patent	assertions	could	
ensure	that	a	patent	holder	who	blankets	the	country	with	letters	can	be	sued	in	any	
federal	district	court	in	the	United	States.	To	take	a	slightly	more	tailored	approach,	
Congress	could,	alternatively,	create	personal	jurisdiction	in	any	district	into	which	a	
patent	holder	sent	demand	letters.	
Given	the	respective	strengths	of	state	governments	and	the	federal	government,	
the	regulatory	regime	in	the	proposed	federal	TROL	Act	is	a	reasonable	starting	point.	
The	Act	condemns	various	types	of	misleading	or	deceptive	communications	made	in	
connection	with	the	enforcement	of	a	federal	patent.	It	also	preempts	state	statutes	
regulating	patent	enforcement	and	instead	allows	state	attorneys	general	to	enforce	the	
federal	statute.	The	regime	imagined	by	the	TROL	Act	thus	capitalizes	on	the	federal	
government’s	ability	to	provide	substantive	uniformity	as	well	as	the	states’	
enforcement	capabilities	and	responsiveness	to	the	citizens,	businesses,	and	
organizations	most	likely	to	receive	unfair	or	deceptive	patent	demand	letters.	
The	TROL	Act,	however,	could	be	improved	in	at	least	two	ways.	First,	the	Act	
goes	into	too	much	detail	defining	prohibited	behavior,	listing	at	least	seventeen	
different	acts	that	are	illegal	under	the	statute.	Because	patent	enforcement	tactics	
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constantly	evolve,	Congress	would	do	better	to	simply	outlaw	“bad	faith”	acts	in	patent	
enforcement	and	let	the	courts	and	the	FTC	apply	that	standard	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	
Although	one	might	insist	that	Congress	needs	to	make	clear	precisely	what	conduct	is	
illegal,	the	long	line	of	pre-Federal	Circuit	case	law	discussed	above	provides	ample	
guidance	about	whether	enforcement	conduct	is	in	good	faith	or	bad	faith.	A	
complicated	statutory	definition	of	prohibited	acts	risks	obscuring	the	basic,	equitable	
purpose	of	imposing	limits	on	patent	enforcement	activities	(cf.	Posner	2013,	86–87	
(critiquing	complex,	multifactor	legal	tests	because	they	obscure	the	purpose	of	the	
relevant	law)).		
Second,	the	TROL	Act	as	currently	drafted	does	not	provide	the	jurisdictional	
clarity	that	Congress	is	well-situated	to	create.	The	Act	would	preempt	only	state	
statutes	that	specifically	regulate	patent	enforcement;	it	would	not	preempt	state	
consumer	protection	laws,	state	laws	relating	to	acts	of	fraud	or	deception,	or	state	tort	
law.	Private	plaintiffs	and	state	law	enforcement	officials	would	continue	to	rely	on	
those	bodies	of	state	law	to	challenge	acts	of	patent	enforcement.	As	discussed,	patent	
holders	can	plausibly	argue	that	state-law	claims	challenging	the	enforcement	of	a	
federal	patent	fall	within	the	federal	courts’	exclusive	subject	matter	jurisdiction.	This	is	
particularly	true	if	the	patent	holder	answers	the	complaint	with	a	counterclaim	seeking	
a	declaratory	judgment	that	the	relevant	state	law	is	unconstitutional	under	the	Federal	
Circuit	immunity	case	law	discussed	above	(see	Biotechnology	Industry	Organization	
2007,	1368	(holding	that	a	claim	seeking	a	declaratory	judgment	that	a	state	law	is	
preempted	by	federal	patent	law	is	subject	to	the	federal	courts’	exclusive	jurisdiction);	
see	also	28	U.S.C.	§	1338(a)	(extending	the	federal	courts’	exclusive	jurisdiction	to	cases	
in	which	patent-law	issues	appear	only	in	a	counterclaim)).	Alternatively,	if	the	patent	
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holder	is	sued	in	federal	court,	it	can	emphasize	a	recent	Supreme	Court	decision	
suggesting	that	most	state-law	claims	that	involve	embedded	issues	of	patent	validity	or	
infringement	(such	as	an	analysis	under	one	of	the	new	state	statutes	of	whether	
infringement	allegations	in	a	demand	letter	were	meritorious)	do	not	fall	within	the	
federal	courts’	exclusive	subject	matter	jurisdiction	(Gunn	2013).		
One	way	to	make	clear	that	civil	cases	challenging	patent	enforcement	must	be	
filed	in	federal	court	would	be	to	preempt	all	relevant	state	laws	regulating	patent	
enforcement,	not	just	the	new	state	statutes	(which	is	the	approach	of	the	TROL	Act),	
and	to	specify	that	claims	under	the	federal	statute	must	be	filed	in	federal	court.	But,	by	
expressly	preempting	all	state	laws	regulating	patent	enforcement,	Congress	would	
eliminate	the	ability	of	private	parties	to	bring	civil	actions	challenging	enforcement	
conduct,	for	the	TROL	Act,	as	currently	drafted,	allows	enforcement	only	by	the	FTC	and	
by	state	attorneys	general.		
Yet	private	enforcement	can	be	an	important	complement	to	proceedings	
brought	by	government	officials.	Not	only	are	private	parties	more	directly	affected	by	
and	better	aware	of	unfair	or	deceptive	assertions	of	infringement,	the	possibility	of	a	
counterclaim	can	provide	important	leverage	to	a	small	organization	or	business	in	
fighting	back	against	a	bottom	feeder,	as	illustrated	by	a	recent	suit	commenced	by	the	
non-profit	Electronic	Frontier	Foundation	(EFF)	on	behalf	of	a	business	targeted	by	
Shipping	&	Transit	LLC	(formerly	known	as	ArrivalStar),	a	notorious	NPE	(see	
Electronic	Frontier	Foundation	2016).	That	suit	seeks	not	only	a	declaration	that	
Shipping	&	Transit’s	patents	are	invalid	and	not	infringed,	it	also	seeks	actual	and	
punitive	damages	under	Maryland’s	new	statute	governing	demand	letters.	That	suit	
challenging	the	validity	of	several	patents	that	have	been	asserted	against	hundreds	of	
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individuals	and	organizations	may	not	have	been	filed	but	for	the	additional	incentives	
provided	by	the	private	civil	claim	available	under	Maryland	law.	Thus,	if	the	TROL	Act	
were	amended	to	preempt	all	state	laws	governing	patent	assertions,	it	should	also	be	
amended	to	permit	private	parties	to	pursue	claims	under	the	statute	in	federal	court.				
In	addition	to	providing	no	clarity	on	matters	of	subject	matter	jurisdiction,	the	
TROL	Act	is	also	silent	on	the	issue	of	personal	jurisdiction.	Consequently,	cases	under	
the	statute	could	be	filed	only	in	federal	courts	in	states	in	which	the	patent	holder	is	
subject	to	personal	jurisdiction.	Because	the	act	of	sending	a	demand	letter	into	a	state	
is,	by	itself,	insufficient	to	create	personal	jurisdiction,	the	number	of	venues	for	suits	
against	patent	holders	who	violate	the	statute	is	potentially	quite	small.	EFF,	for	
example,	was	forced	to	file	its	recent	suit	in	Florida	–	the	patent	holder’s	home	state	–	
even	though	the	case	involved	demand	letters	sent	to	a	small	business	in	Maryland	and	
claims	under	Maryland	law	(see	id.).	Congress	could,	by	statute,	sensibly	expand	the	
federal	courts’	personal	jurisdiction	in	cases	involving	demand	letters	to	allow	a	
recipient	to	file	suit	in	the	state	into	which	the	patent	holder	sent	the	letter.		
6.5 Conclusion 
Under	the	Federal	Circuit’s	current	case	law,	no	government	body	–	state	or	
federal;	legislative,	administrative,	or	judicial	–	will	be	able	to	meaningfully	police	unfair	
or	deceptive	patent	enforcement.	As	this	chapter	has	shown,	however,	the	broad	
immunity	the	Federal	Circuit	has	conferred	on	patent	holders	provides	too	much	leeway	
for	manipulation	and	harmful	tactics.	Returning	to	the	equitable,	good	faith	immunity	
standard	would	respect	a	patent	holder’s	right	to	make	legitimate	allegations	of	
infringement	while	not	shielding	the	extortionate	schemes	recently	deployed	by	
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bottom-feeder	trolls.	Under	a	good	faith	standard,	both	the	states	and	the	federal	
government	could	play	a	useful	role	in	regulating	patent	assertions.	An	ideal	regime	
would	allow	states	(and	private	parties)	to	capitalize	on	their	superior	enforcement	
capabilities,	with	the	federal	government	providing	a	uniform	substantive	standard	and	
clarifying	the	vexing	jurisdictional	matters	that	arise	in	legal	challenges	to	patent	
enforcement	conduct.	
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